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S. CASS WEILAND*

Congress and the Transnational
Crime Problem
I. Introduction
A.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

In recent years, federal criminal prosecutions, like so much contemporary civil litigation, have become increasingly complex and frequently
dependent upon evidence gathered outside the United States. For many
observers, sophisticated criminal activity, including drug trafficking and
fraud schemes, seems to inevitably involve offshore elements. Moreover,
an increasingly diverse segment of society is being victimized by these
types of crimes. These developments have not been overlooked by the
Justice Department nor by other federal investigative agencies which have
been required to dispatch attorneys and investigators with increasing frequency to various foreign locales, particularly so-called "offshore tax
havens." Nor has Congress been able to ignore the phenomenon as victims
exert constituent pressure for legislative action.
Putting aside for the moment the potentially serious diplomatic ramifications of having large numbers of non-diplomat executive and legislative
branch employees dealing with foreign government and business people,
it gradually became clear to Congress that statutory and policy changes
were necessary in order to accommodate the demands of the American
public to prosecute criminal activity in the United States regardless of its
origins. Developments in 1985 have, if anything, tended to increase the
clamor for government action. As this article shows, however, there are
definite limits to the continual extensions of U.S. criminal law and policy
and Congress is probably already reaching those limits.
*Of Counsel, Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller in Dallas, Texas; Former
Trial Attorney, Department of Justice and Chief Counsel, Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations.
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In 1983-84, the 98th Congress finally responded to the demand for action
in several important ways. It provided the Executive Branch with additional tools in the tax area, in the ticklish area of foreign evidence admissibility, and in linking investigatory information disclosures to trade
concessions. In 1985-1986, Congress continued to demonstrate its willingness to take action in this area although its accomplishments have been
far less substantive.
B.

THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL PROBLEM

Before addressing these statutory developments and discussing additional needed improvements, a note about the extent of the international
criminal problem will provide context for the remainder of the article.
Even a casual observer cannot help but notice the gradually rising level
of government interest which has been engendered by transnational crime.
For some, the furor over the federal prosecution of the Marc Rich company and its principals epitomizes the equally important but competing
issues involved: the U.S. interest in revenue collection versus an unrelenting Swiss sovereignty interest. In Marc Rich, I a federal grand jury in
Manhattan issued a subpoena to a U.S. subsidiary of a Swiss company
in connection with a tax fraud investigation. The recipient of the subpoena
argued that it could not produce the records since it was not in possession
of them and because Swiss law would not permit it. District Judge Leonard
Sand ruled against the company, levied a daily fine of $50,000 and froze
$55 million in Rich assets in the United States. Ultimately, the Swiss
government ordered the seizure of the records in Switzerland and its
spokesman reacted furiously to what was considered high handed activity
by the federal prosecutors. 2 The case touched off a chorus of criticism
from a variety of European and Caribbean jurisdictions, many of which
had already been swept up in other cases involving the same type of
controversy.
A somewhat contemporaneous series of events developed in Miami
where a Canadian bank was held in contempt for failing to comply with
a subpoena served on its Miami agent requesting records of an offshore
company which were believed to be held by the bank's Bahamas branch. 3
1. In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Marc Rich and Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983)
(affirming district court contempt holding).
2. See, e.g., War Breaks Out Over a Rich Man's Tax Return, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 24,
1983, at 83; Marc Rich's $48 Million Audit, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 1983, at 74; Switzerland
Enters Marc Rich Case to Halt U.S. from Obtaining Subpoenaed Papers, Wall St. J., Aug.

15, 1983, at 3.
3. In re Grand Jury Proceedings United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384
(I lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3086 (1982).
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The bank refused to produce the records based on a fifth amendment
objection and its own potential criminal liability in the Bahamas for disclosure of confidential information. The district court ruled against the
bank and fined it $25,000 per day. On appeal, the Court upheld a $1.8
million fine against the bank. Thereafter further litigation ensued involving
the same bank but a different grand jury subpoena. In In re Grand Jury
Proceedings: United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS II), 4 the district
court ordered the bank to comply with the subpoena requiring the production of bank records located in the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands.
The bank claimed protection based upon foreign secrecy laws but was
again held in contempt. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit decided that the
district court should hear further argument based on foreign relations
issues and matters of comity. After another hearing the district court again
ruled against the bank and was affirmed. 5 In BNS lI the British, Canadian,
Bahamian, and Caymanian governments were all involved either directly
or as amicus curiae.
Other developments, primarily in the civil area, have led foreign jurisdictions to enact so-called "blocking" laws, which are designed to prevent
the disclosure of business records, particularly in conjunction with U.S.
antitrust and patent suits. Foreign blocking laws arose in some cases as
a specific response to liberal American discovery procedures which had
become of great concern to business and government leaders throughout
Western Europe but particularly in France, Britain, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, and West Germany. 6 Their reaction is understandable given that
their jurisprudence does not allow for the burden, cost and downright
harassment caused by American discovery. Moreover, some European
governments have officially supported alleged antitrust violations committed by European companies which are the subject of U.S. litigation;
hence, the governments often see themselves as stakeholders as well as
protectors of national sovereignty.
Finally, a spate of cases has developed involving foreign tax shelters
and these have begun to stack up in the Tax Court. One senior IRS official
estimates that at least one-third of the 60,000 cases backlogged in the Tax
Court involve allegedly illegal or improper tax shelters. Many of these
have an offshore aspect. And 40-50 percent of the 300 criminal investi-

4. 722 F.2d 657 (11th Cir. 1983).
5. Id., 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 778 (1985).
6. An excellent recent discussion of the ramifications of the French blocking statute on
U.S. civil litigation is found in Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 508-516 (N.D. 111.
1984). "The Blocking Statute obviously is a manifestation of French displeasure with American pretrial discovery procedures, which are significantly broader than the procedures

accepted in other countries." Id. at 508; and see Toms, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 15

INT'L LAW.

585 (1981).

SUMMER 1986

1028

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

gations the IRS had under way in 1985 involved offshore entities. 7 A

ready example is derived from public reports regarding a large Washington, D.C. tax haven promoter which indicated that a key element in his
allegedly illegal scheme was the use of a Cayman Island company through

which commodities and government securities trades were supposedly
made. 8 The use of futures trading as a tax dodge is not new of course.
Congress moved to eliminate some of the abuses of "tax straddles" in
1981. But in 1982 the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
heard testimony from a convicted commodity investment broker to the
effect that unscrupulous promoters were still capitalizing on commodity
9
loopholes coupled with offshore secrecy laws to reap huge illegal benefits.
Senior officials in the Justice Department have also pointed to the link
between fraudulent tax shelters and bank secrecy jurisdictions. 1 Ironically, Congressional efforts to stem shelter abuses may have prompted

some offshore movement. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 and the Revenue
Act of 1978 enacted "at risk" rules so that tax losses could no longer be

7. Remarks of Richard C. Wassenaar, Asst. Commissioner (Crim. Investigation), IRS,
at Washington Tax Conference, San Antonio, Texas (May 2, 1985).
8. Wall St. J., October 29, 1984, at 1, 20.
9. Commodity Investment Fraud, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982), testimony of Kenneth Levin, at 25-26.
CHAIRMAN ROTH. Mr. Levin, in your testimony, you alluded to some cases where the
schemes were going undetected because neither the victim ... nor the operator had any
financial reason to want to expose the situation. I assume you are talking about some
kind of tax shelter.
MR. LEVIN. That is correct. There are tax shelters in different areas. Some are more
specifically involved with commodities.
CHAIRMAN ROTH. Would you please explain how they would operate'?
MR. LEVIN. I will give you a brief summary of how some of them do operate.
A client (is interested) in investing in . . . an off shore business outside of the United
States. A grantor's trust is set up in the United States for the investors .... The funds
are then invested in an offshore partnership that does not have to file with the Internal
Revenue Service in the United States. The only filing that is necessary is the grantor's
trust that files an addendum along with their 1041 or 1040. The money is then invested
in the commodities markets in an offshore brokerage firm, because the laws are different
in trading than the laws that are traded here in the United States, and to give you an
example, if, in fact, you Senator, open up a brokerage account in Merrill Lynch and buy
ounces on a futures contract, when that gold is purchased, they must ticket your account
number to that stamped purchase price immediately in the order room. Well, in Europe,
they do not have to put your name to that purchase price for days, weeks, or months.
The laxity of laws overseas in commodities makes it very easy for investors to trade their
money in the market, or I should say, the promoters trade their money in the market
purposely losing it, but the system that they use is this: the investors lose their money
and the investors have no idea what is going on.
10. See, Abusive Tax Shelters, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the
House Ways and Means Committee, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)(testimony of Glenn L.
Archer, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division).
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claimed for funds not invested. But as Assistant Attorney General for the
Tax Division Glenn Archer has testified:
Enactment of these limitations on artificial tax benefits has had one ironic effect.
The irony is that the fraudulent part of many tax shelters currently marketed
represents an effort on the part of the promoter to circumvent the at risk rules,
frequently by means of offshore entities. I

Indeed, evidence elicited in several IRS/Department of Justice tax shelter prosecutions demonstrates the tremendous amounts of offshore activity which is typical. For example, several cases have involved Belize and
a single prosecution in 1982 featured activity in the Cayman Islands,
2
Switzerland, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala and Panama.'
While all of this has been transpiring, Congress has been watching.
Through a series of hearings and reports, both Houses have observed the
evolution of these "transnational" cases and the resultant impact on U.S.
foreign relations, but until 1984 very little legislation had resulted. 13 This

11. Id.

12. Information derived from interviews with IRS and Justice Department personnel.
13. Congressional hearings and reports involving offshore entities, band secrecy and
related issues include:
IRS: Taxing the Heroin Barons, volume II, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
Oversight Hearingsinto the Operationsof the IRS (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven,
and Narcotics Traffickers Tax Program), Hearings Before the House Comm. on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs, 94th

Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
Foreign and CorporateBribes, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
Internal Revenue Service and Treasury Department Enforcement of the Foreign Bank
Account Reporting Requirement of the Bank Secrecy Act, second report together with
additional views, House Comm. on Government Operations, H.R. REP. No 246, 95th

Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
InternationalBanking Operations, Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Sabcomm. on Financial Institutions, Supervision, Regulation

and Insurance, 95th Cong., lst Sess. (1977).
Currency Transaction and Transportation Reporting Requirements of the Bank Secrecy
Act, Hearings Before the House Comm. on Government Operations, Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
Investigation of Narcotics Trafficking Proceeds (Chicago, Illinois), HearingsBefore House
Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 95th Cong., lst Sess. (1978).
Offshore Tax Havens, Hearings Before House Comm. on Ways and Means, Subcomm.

on Oversight, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
Edge Corporation Branching; Foreign Bank Takeovers; and International Banking Facilities, Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th

Cong., lst Sess. (1979).
The Operations of U.S. Banks in the International Capital Markets, Hearings Before

House Comm. on Banking, Financeand Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., lst Sess. (1979).
Patterns of Currency Transactions and Their Relationship to Narcotics Traffic, Hearings
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article will explore the effect of Congressional and Executive Branch

inaction in terms of the costs to the public as well as the difficulties

Bejore House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Subcomm. on General
Oversight and Renegotiation, 96th Cong., IstSess. (1979).
Illegal Narcotics Profits, HearingsBefore Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1979); report together
with additional views, S. REP. No. 887, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980).
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act Amendments, Report to accompany
H.R. 5961, House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). Banks and
Narcotics Money Flow in South Florida, Hearings on S. 2236 (to amend the Currency
andForeign TransactionsReportingAct), Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
Income Tax Treaties, HearingsBefore tile
House Comm. on Ways and Means, Subcomm.
on Oversight, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
Oversight Hearings on the Currency and Foreign TransactionsReporting Act, Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Banking, Financeand Urban Affairs, Subcomm. on General
Oversight and Renegotiation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
Home Health Care Fraud and Abuse, Hearings Before tileSenate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981);
Report, S. REP. No. 210, 97th Cong., IstSess. (1981).
Disclosure of IRS Information to Assist with the Enforcement of CriminalLaw, Hearings
on S. 732 (to amend the disclosure provisions of the Tax Re orm Act of 1976) Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, Subcomm. on Oversight of the IRS, 97th Cong., IstSess.
(1981).
InternationalNarcotics Trafficking, HearingsBefiore the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, Permanent Subcomn. on Investigations, 97th Cong., IstSess. (1981).
Commodity Investment Fraud Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, Permanent Subcontm. on Investigations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess (1982); Report with
additional views, S. REP. No. 495, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
Improper Use of Foreign Addresses to Evade U.S. Taxes, Hearings Be'ore the House
Comm. on Government Operations, Subcomnm. on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary
Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
To Investigate the Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Bank Secrecy Act, Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Ajffirs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982).
SEC and Citicorp, Hearings Before the House Comm. oilEnergy and Commerce, Subconn. on Oversight and Investigations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
Crime and Secrecy: The Use f OlJfshore Batiks and Companies, Hearings Before the
Senate Comnm. on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subconmm. on Investigations, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 98TH CONG., IST
SESS.,

STAFF STUDY OF THE CRIME

AND SECRECY: THE USE OF OFFSHORE

BANKS AND

COMPANI1S (Comm. Print. 1983).
SEC and Citicorp, Hearings Before the House Comnin. on Banking, Finance, and Urban
Aifairs, 98th Cong., IstSess. (1983).
Tax Evasion through the Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries, Hearings
Before the House Conan. on Government Operations, Subcomnm. on General Oversight
and Renegotiation, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
Oversight Hearingsinto the Bank Secrecy Act. HearingsBefore the House FinanceComm.
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Subcomnm. on General Oversight and Renegotiation, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
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involved in trying to find government remedies. It is useful first to review
some of the practical as well as legal problems encountered in waging
war on crime involving offshore jurisdictions.
II. Impediments to Transnational
Evidence Gathering
A.

COSTS/GEOGRAPHY

Numerous factors inhibit the efficient, much less successful, prosecution of a case involving internationalized crime. Not the least of these are
the costs which must be incurred and the geography which must be traversed. The details surrounding these problems are fairly apparent, but
consider for example, the cost of foreign travel, the necessity of obtaining
interpreters and foreign law enforcement assistance, and other logistical
considerations which further complicate the process.
Issues dealing with foreign customs may be more difficult than many
seasoned international travelers might imagine. For example, the Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in one of its publications on
the subject reported the consternation with which various Caribbean jurisdictions greet the arrival of U.S. law enforcement personnel.1 4 Many
U.S. law enforcement personnel have actually embarked on investigatory
missions without advising the State Department, much less the foreign
government, and simply arrive in the country on the basis of their civilian
15
U.S. passport expecting to interview members of the local citizenry.
This type of activity is particularly fraught with risks in certain jurisdictions, such as Switzerland and Panama, where U.S. law enforcement
officials would no doubt be arrested if they were to attempt to conduct
an interview with, say, a local banker. In practice, even civil litigants have
been detained by Swiss police after failing to adhere to Swiss law by
attempting to conduct depositions without proper clearance and Swiss
judicial participation.
B.

SECRECY/BLOCKING LAWS

In addition to the sometimes severe practical restrictions upon gathering
evidence to prosecute international crime, there remain enormous legal
14. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., STAFF STUDY OF THE CRIME AND SECRECY: THE USE OF OFFSHORE
BANKS AND COMPANIES 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Crime and Secrecy, Staff Study].
15. The Comprehensive REPORT OF THE SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,

CRIME

AND

SECRECY:

THE

USE

OF

OFFSHORE

BANKS

AND

COMPANIES,

99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) was issued in August/September 1985 as a follow-up to hearings
and a previous Staff Study. The Report chronicles problems generated by the presence of
U.S. investigators abroad, such as one incident involving St. Vincent. Id. at I 1l.
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obstacles. Much has been written about the development of international
secrecy and blocking laws around the world and the apparently willing
participation of foreign banks and companies in facilitating U.S.-based
crime. In Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies,

the staff of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations said:
For the United States, its institutions, and its people, the use of the international
banking and business system for criminal purposes is an increasing problem.
It undermines the integrity of American banks and other institutions of commerce. It threatens the integrity of our tax system and deprives the Treasury
of badly needed revenue. It feeds the coffers of criminal enterprises. It corrupts
public and private morals. And, despite some major prosecutorial successes in
recent years, the problem is a source of great frustration for U.S. law enforcement authorities and for Congress. 16

Obviously, there is nothing evil per se about bank and commercial
secrecy. Indeed, the most famous secrecy jurisdiction, Switzerland, enacted strong criminal sanctions for revealing bank information in 1934 as
a means of protecting persons involved in slipping funds out of Nazi
Germany. British common law secrecy also had a regulatory origin. In
Tournier v. National Provencal and Union Bank of England, the court

established a contractual relationship between the bank and its customer,
Tournier, about whom his banker was saying terrible things. 17 But the
occasionally praiseworthy effects of offshore secrecy do little to succor
the victims of criminals who capitalize on the anonymity afforded by such
laws.
On the other hand, foreign governments like to point to the United
States itself as a secrecy jurisdiction given the protection enjoyed by U.S.
account holders and taxpayers through the Right to Financial Privacy Act
of 197818 and the Tax Reform Act of 1976.19 As currently enacted, the
Financial Privacy Act is sufficiently restrictive to prevent banks from
notifying law enforcement personnel unless the suspicious activity amounts
to a crime, although Congress and the Administration moved to loosen
these restrictions in 1985. But financial and corporate information found
in the United States has always been subject to grand jury subpoenas,
IRS summonses or foreign criminal investigatory requests. Most foreign
secrecy jurisdictions have no really parallel domestic vehicles for obtaining like information. Hence, although American institutions do provide
substantial investor secrecy via legislation and custom, that secrecy tends
to yield quickly to law enforcement's actual or perceived needs. Generally,
the same cannot be said for the tax havens which American prosecutors
16.
17.
18.
19.

Crime and Secrecy, Staff Study, supra note 14, at 3.
Tournier v. National Provencal and Union Bank of England (1922).
12 U.S.C. § 3400 etseq. (1982).
See especially 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103 (West Supp. 1985).
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view as moving toward greater rather than lesser accommodation of
criminals.
Indeed, in recent years numerous foreign jurisdictions actually have
taken steps to shore up their respective secrecy and blocking laws. Both
categories have been troublesome to U.S. criminal and civil litigators. In
cases where the U.S. government is not a party the discovery situation
is frequently hopeless. For example, in 1960 France enacted a statute
which denied "the legality of injunctions issued by American courts concerning persons or documents locafed in territory not under the jurisdic'20
tion of the United States."
By 1981 France had perfected its blocking scheme to the point of prohibiting the requestingof information which could be used in later foreign
proceedings. 2' Many jurisdictions have followed suit and one estimate
places the number of foreign blocking laws at twenty-six. 22
The situation with respect to simple secrecy laws is even more dramatic.
Consider that a "tax haven" can most readily be defined as a no or low
tax jurisdiction providing some depositor confidentiality. There are literally dozens of these havens with secrecy laws which insulate information
from routine U.S. law enforcement inquiries under the premise of protecting the legitimate privacy interests of depositors.
C. PAST LEGISLATIVE INACTION

Until recently Congress has done little if anything to combat the problems engendered by transnational crime. One who commits mail fraud,
wire fraud, or who engages in labor racketeering, arson for profit, bankruptcy fraud, securities fraud, etc. through the use of offshore facilities
which are shrouded with secrecy protection is penalized to no greater
exten than one who perpetrates his crime in the more or less open environment of the fifty states. Yet he is subject to far less risk of detection
and society pays a far greater price for investigation and prosecution.
Moreover, the Statute of Limitations, 23 and the Speedy Trial Act 24 did
not, until 1984, include any specific provision for delay stemming from the
need to acquire offshore records or testimony. Thus, by utilizing offshore
entities, the perpetrator could frustrate the prosecutor by increasing the
20. Quoted in International Law Association, Report of the 51st Session, 1964, at 404.
21. Commercial Documents Act of 1968-80, and Decree No. 81-550 of 12 May 1981,
concerning the transmission of Documents or Information of an Economic Commercial or
Technical Nature to Foreign Individuals or Legal Persons.
22. Crime and Secrecy, Staff Study, supra n. 14 at 13, citing speech by John M. Fedders,
Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3281 et seq.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.
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likelihood that the Statute of Limitations would run before indictment and
then, assuming a grand jury indicts, demanding a speedy trial while the
prosecutor is attempting to obtain the offshore records he needs for trial.
Most commentators would probably agree that the thrust of Congressional initiatives from the 1960s into the 1980s has been toward providing
criminal defendants with much more procedural protection, including additional discovery and freer access to the courts. Certainly the legacy of
the Warren Court was one emphasizing, defining and, perhaps, inventing
defendants' rights. Many of those legislatively and judicially mandated
protections were doubtless necessary. Their result, however, has been to
shield further the international criminal; his reliance upon domestic protections coupled with offshore secrecy has made the pursuit of such violators arduous and their identification and conviction often impossible.
!ii. Legislative Remedies:
The 98th Congress (1983-84)
Whether by design or accident, the 98th Congress did come to grips
with some aspects of the "offshore crime problem." For many, the
Congressional action was long overdue and not particularly impressive;
in fact, however, the measures which did pass represent a virtual tidal
wave of accomplishment for a Congress which has not even been able to
pass appropriations bills for years. Whatever the cause for legislative
movement, it seems clear that much of the newly expressed interest in
secrecy jurisdictions sprang from an overwhelming suspicion (if not empirical evidence) that substantial tax revenues are being lost through evaders' use of tax havens. As suggested above, recent Congressional investigation has tended to confirm that the offshore secrecy havens have
attracted not only narcotics money and fraud proceeds but also the siphoned income of doctors, lawyers, tax protesters, and others. 25 In fact,
the increasing prevalence of tax haven bank accounts by otherwise average Americans has led many to26conclude that the problem is far more
serious than previously believed.
25. See hearings cited in supra n. 13.

26. The Commissioner of the IRS told Congress in 1983:
We are concerned as you are with the growing number of seemingly law-abiding persons
of moderate means who are using offshore banking facilities and other offshore entities
as a means of tax evasion. We believe many such people are learning of these tax havens
through the efforts of unscrupulous individuals who are marketing tax dollars using offshore banking facilities, and other connections.
There is a known trend toward the brokering of banks, that is, for a price you can create
or buy your own bank for the expressed purpose of evading or certainly avoiding tax
liability.
Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ofthe Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,

98th Cong., lst Sess. (1983), at 16. [hereinafter cited as Crime and Secrecy, Hearings.]
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27

Whether the Reagan Administration shared the view that the offshore
havens were attracting more and more "average" Americans or was primarily concerned with more traditional criminal use of the offshore havens
is not clear. The Administration did, however, propose as an important
element of its Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) a provision which potentially could have a major effect on the use of the havens by U.S. citizens.
The CBI includes an enticement for Caribbean jurisdictions which seek
to attract large scale tourist business in the form of U.S. business conventions. The trade-off involves a commitment on the part of the foreign
jurisdiction to enter into an exchange of information agreement with the
United States. Thereafter, members of American groups wishing to hold
conventions in that offshore jurisdiction are entitled to receive convention
28
tax deduction treatment for their indulgence.
27. See Sharp & Steele, The Caribbean Basin Exchange of Information Draft Agreement-A Technical Analysis, 19 INT'L LAW. 949 (1985).
28. The actual language of the CBI provision (Pub. L. No. 98-7) reads:
C. AUTHORITY TO CONCLUDE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AGREEMENTS(i) IN GENERAL-The Secretary is authorized to negotiate and conclude an agreement for the exchange of information with any beneficiary country. Except as provided
in clause (ii), an exchange of information (not limited to information concerning nationals
or residents of the United States or the beneficiary country) as may be necessary or
appropriate to carry out and enforce the tax laws of the United States and the beneficiary
country (whether criminal or civil proceedings), including information which may otherwise be subject to nondisclosure provisions of the local law of the beneficiary country
such as provisions respecting bank secrecy and bearer shares. The exchange of information agreement shall be terminable by either country on reasonable notice and shall
provide that information received by either country will be disclosed only to persons
or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) involved in the administration
and oversight of, or in the determination of appeals in respect of, taxes of the United
States or the beneficiary country and will be used by such persons or authorities only
for such purposes.
(ii) NONDISCLOSURE OF QUALIFIED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
SOUGHT FOR CIVIL TAX PURPOSES-An exchange of information agreement need
not provide for the exchange of qualified confidential information which is sought only
for civil tax purposes if(1) the Secretary of Treasury, after making all reasonable efforts to negotiate an
agreement which included the exchange of such information, determines that such
an agreement cannot be negotiated but that the agreement which was negotiated will
significantly assist in the administration and enforcement of the tax laws of the United
States, and
(11) the President determines that the agreement as negotiated is in the national
security interest of the United States.
(iii) QUALIFIED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION DEFINED-For purposes of
this subparagraph, the term 'qualified confidential information' means information which
is subject to the nondisclosure provisions of any local law of the beneficiary country
regarding bank secrecy or ownership of bearer shares.
(iv) CIVIL TAX PURPOSES-For purpose of this subparagraph, the determination
of whether information is sought only for civil tax purposes shall be made by the
SUMMER 1986
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Unfortunately for both U.S. law enforcement and business communities, there has been little movement in the Caribbean toward information
sharing agreements-at least on the sweeping scale called for by the CBI.
A partial exception is the Cayman Islands' July 1984 decision to enter
into an agreement with the United States to exchange narcotics-related
information only. This agreement, however, is insufficient to trigger the
beneficial aspects of the CBI absent some Congressional amendment. The
CBI definitely requires the exchange of tax information. Indeed, it requires
that the foreign jurisdiction comply with U.S. demands in a civil tax case
as well, although this provision can be waived. In any case, in approving
the CBI provision relating to disclosure of information Congress sent a
strong message that it is concerned with the impact of foreign secrecy
provisions on U.S. law enforcement and heralded the possibility of ad29
ditional action.
B.

FOREIGN SALES CORPORATIONS

Congressional interest in exchange of information agreements and, ultimately, the prosecution of international crime has also manifested itself
in provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,30 which created a new
entity labeled the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC). 3 1FSCs are designed
to replace Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISCs) as the principal U.S. export incentive mechanism. Historically DISCs have served
as the domestic export subsidiaries of United States firms. Among the
fundamental requirements for the new FSCs is that they can be organized
in a United States possession other than Puerto Rico or in a foreign
country, but that country must have an exchange of tax information agreement with the United States. 32 Under this legislation the specific exchange
of information agreement can resemble that called for in the Caribbean
Basin Initiative (§ 927(e)(3)(A)) or any agreement (but probably resem-

requesting party.
D. COORDINATION with Section 6103-Any exchange of information agreement negotiated under subparagraph (C) shall be treated as an income tax convention for purposes
of section 6103 (k)(4).
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to conventions, seminars, or other meetings which begin after June 30, 1983.
29. Just what type of further action remains to be seen. On May I, 1984 Congressman
Fortney Stark (D-Cal) introduced H.R. 5558 to amend the CBI to provide that even designation of countries as CBI beneficiaries would be predicated on an exchange of information
agreement.
30. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
31. See Block, Gilbert & Kuenster, Transition from DISC to a Foreign Sales Corporation,
19 INT'L LAW. 343 (1985).
32. See 26 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A)(1984).
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bling a traditional income tax treaty) which the Secretary of Treasury
33
certifies is adequate.
American frustration with foreign secrecy havens was apparently so
well understood by the summer of 1984 when the Senate/House conferees
adopted the Deficit Reduction Act that the Conference Report was quite
cryptic with respect to the question of exchange of information agreements:
The [conference] agreement requires tax records (including invoices) to be kept
in an office in a country which is either a party to an exchange of information
agreement with the United States or an income tax treaty partaier, which the
Treasury certifies as having an acceptable exchange of information program
under the treaty. The conferees intend that a foreign country, to qualify for this
treatment, not be a country that has a statute (or other stated policy) which
denies the IRS access to the home office of the FSC for audit purposes. Therefore, the conferees intend that the Treasury assure itself of access to the home
office of a FSC before certifying a 34treaty partner or before entering into an
exchange of information agreement.
C. WITHHOLDING TAX ON INTEREST PAID TO FOREIGN PERSONS

With some amount of notoriety, the 98th Congress decided to repeal
the withholding tax on interest paid to nonresident aliens and foreign
corporations. This move was taken with the full and complete support of
35
the Reagan Administration and had broad bipartisan support.
Essentially, this legislation will eventually phase out the so-called "Antilles window" which has allowed foreign corporations and others to incorporate in the Netherlands Antilles for the purpose of receiving reduced
withholding tax treatment. This loophole, of course, produced extensive
venue shopping and began to receive strong criticism from various quarters during 1983-84. As a partial compromise Congress decided only to
repeal the tax on interest paid on obligations issued after the date of
enactment.
Some Members of Congress were concerned that the repeal of the thirty
percent withholding tax would tend to attract unsavory characters for the
sale of Treasury and general U.S. corporate debt instruments. Representative Doug Barnard, Jr. (D-Ga.), urged the Treasury Department to "impose on the sale of the debt stringent procedures that will identify their
beneficial owners and require them to prove their foreign status." 36 Discretion to require proof of the foreign status of beneficial owners was
33. 26 U.S.C. § 927(c)(3)(B) (1984). See discussion in 59 TAXES INT'L, 3-0 (Sept. 1984).
34. COMM. OF CONFERENCE, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, H. REP. No. 9861, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 976 (1984). [hereinafter cited as COMM. ON CONFERENCE].
35. The legislation is codified in Section 127 of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, which is Part

A of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984; see 26 U.S.C. § 871(i)(1984).
36. CONG. REC. H8045 (daily ed. July 31, 1984).
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vested with the Secretary after Congress itself declined to extend 1982
registration of securities requirements pertaining to certain obligations
subject to the repeal of the 30 percent tax on the theory that: (1) they will
be sold under procedures reasonably designed to prevent sale or resale
to U.S. persons; (2) the interest will be payable outside the 37U.S. only;
and (3) because U.S. holders will be subject to tax penalties.
In any case, the legislation authorizes the Secretary of Treasury to
reimpose the withholding tax for interest paid to persons in countries that
Technically, this
do not exchange information with the United States. 38
involves the removal of an exemption for interest paid.
D.

FOREIGN EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY

Although Congressional tax and trade related efforts to have an impact
on offshore crime generally and U.S. tax evasion specifically probably
received greater attention, a little noticed amendment to the 1984 crime
bill will doubtless have substantial influence on criminal litigators. Chapter
XII of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 198439 includes Part K
on Foreign Evidence. This provision essentially provides evidentiary
treatment for foreign records of regularly conducted activity equivalent
40
to that provided for U.S. business records.
This legislation also allows for a three year suspension of the statute
of limitation in cases where the U.S. government has officially requested
evidence of an offense in a foreign country. 4 1 The foreign evidence amendment also provides for a one year delay in the Speedy Trial Act rules in
cases where an official request for foreign evidence is pending after in37. COMM. ON CONFERENCE, supra note 34, at 937.
38. 26 U.S C. § 87(i)(5) provides:
(5) SECRETARY MAY PROVIDE SUBSECTION NOT TO APPLY IN CASES OF
INADEQUATE INFORMATION EXCHANGE-

(A) IN GENERAL-If the Secretary determines that the exchange of information
between the United States and a foreign country is inadequate to prevent evasion of
the United States income tax by United States persons, the Secretary may provide
in writing (and publish a statement) that the provisions of this subsection shall not
apply to payments of interest to any person within such foreign country (or payments
addressed to, or for the account of, persons within such foreign country) during the
period(i) beginning on the date specified by the Secretary and
(ii) ending on the date the Secretary determines that the exchange of information
between the United States and the foreign country is adequate to prevent the
evasion of the United States income tax by United States persons.
(B) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS-Subparagraph (A) shall not
apply to the payment of interest on any obligation which is issued on or before the
date of the publication of the Secretary's determination under such subparagraph.
39. Passed as part of H.J. Res. 648, P.L. 98-73, Oct. 12, 1984.

40. 18 U.S.C. § 505 (1984). See FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3292 (1984).
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dictment. 42 These suspension or tolling provisions are reasonable and
long overdue. They were first introduced by Senator William Roth (RDel.), a moderate Republican, who chairs the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, and were immediately supported by the Department of
Justice. After the legislation passed the Senate as part of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act of 1984 early in the year it was introduced by liberal
Democratic Congressman John Conyers (D-Mich.) in the House and passed
43
separately with certain minor alterations as H.R. 5919.
The foreign evidence admissibility legislation will eliminate to some
extent the necessity of taking foreign depositions to authenticate docu-

ments-a tedious, costly, and time consuming process. 44 As Senator Roth
explained at the time this legislation was first adopted by the Senate:
The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations which I chair has been probing
the criminal use of offshore havens for 2 years. We have found that billions of

dollars annually are channeled to offshore jurisdictions that do not cooperate
with U.S. law enforcement efforts. Unfortunately, an ever expanding range of
American citizens appear to be utilizing those havens. Their activity and international crime generally will continue to grow unless there is a change in the
law. These straightforward changes in domestic procedural and evidentiary law
are the least we can do to relieve complexity, reduce
the cost, and shorten the
45
time needed to bring these criminals to justice.

E.

BANK SECRECY ACT AMENDMENTS

Recent prosecutions have shown that one of the more effective tools
available to assist in efforts to combat narcotics trafficking has been the
Bank Secrecy Act. 46 The Bank Secrecy Act, formally entitled the Currenc., and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, was intended to provide
law enforcement agencies with recordkeeping and reporting tools to investigate the financial aspects of a wide variety of illegal activities including drug trafficking. Under this 1970 Act, a bank or other financial
institution is required to file a Currency Transaction Report (CTR or Form
4789) with the IRS for each deposit, withdrawal or exchange of currency

42. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1984).
43. See HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT ON
RECORDS, REP. No. 907, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).

ADMISSIBILITY

OF

FOREIGN

BUSINESS

44. See generally, Crime and Secrecy, Hearings, supra note 22, prepared testimony of D.
Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, describing litigation of U.S. v. Carver and
Lemire (also called Interconex) at 210-233; and Weiland, The Use of Offshore Institutions
to Facilitate CriminalActivity in the U.S., 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL., 115, 113-34 (1984).
Just how costly this type of litigation can be is demonstrated by the district court's decision
in Interconex to award the government $200,000 in costs of prosecution. Crim. No. 81-00342
(D.C. 1981), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Lemire, 702 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
45. CONG. REC. S561 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1984).
46. 31 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.
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or monetary instruments in excess of $10,000. A related requirement
involves the filing of a Currency and Monetary Instrument Report (CMIR)
or Form 4790 with the Customs Service when carrying currency or monetary instruments valued at $5,000 or more into or out of the United States.
These twin reporting requirements by banks and travelers complement
each other as noted by a Senate Subcommittee in 1983:
If banks were not required to report large currency transactions, there would
be little need for criminals to smuggle money into or out of the country. Currency
simply could be taken into a bank and the funds transferred abroad to a secret
bank account without disclosing the identities of the persons arranging the
transfer or receiving the funds. Conversely, without reports on the import or
export of currency, the requirement that banks report large currency transactions would be relatively ineffectual. Criminals could easily travel to a nearby
foreign country and convert
their currency into a more compact and more
47
profitable form of wealth.

In recognition of the utility of the Bank Secrecy Act, Congress increased
the penalties for violations from $1,000 and one year in jail to $50,000
and a possible five year imprisonment. The 1984 legislation, which was
included in the crime package passed at the end of the session, also
increased the reporting threshold for CMIRs from $5,000 to $10,000, added
a provision which was intended to clarify the warrantless search authority
of Customs Service officials for outbound travelers, and increased the
possible rewards payable to informants for information leading to a recovery under the Act. 48 Despite some objection in the House, the legislation also made violations of the Act predicate offenses for the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization statute (RICO) 49 and the
5
wiretapping statute. 0

Since 1980, the Treasury Department, in cooperation with the Justice
Department has been involved in Operation Greenback. This task force
approach was originally designed to investigate the huge cash surplus in
the Federal Reserve Bank in Florida which was believed to have developed
as a result of drug marketing activity in the area. Most Federal Reserve
Banks have a deficit of currency; Florida was an exception. By 1980,
Florida had a peak of $5.8 billion in excess currency. 51 The investigation
gradually spread to otherjudicial districts, such as the Western and Southern Districts of Texas (San Antonio and Houston/Corpus Christi/Browns47. Crime and Secrecy, Staff Study, supra note 14 at 114-15; see also discussion in The
Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions and Money Laundering (interim

Report of the President's Commission on Organized Crime, October 1984).
48. H.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., § 901(g) (1984).
49. Id. amending 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
50. Id. at § 1203(c), amending 18 U.S.C. §2516(I)(g).
51. Crime and Secrecy, Hearings, supra note 22, prepared testimony of John M. Walker,

Jr., Assistant Secretary (Enforcement and Operations), Department of Treasury, at 285.
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Ville). In the meantime, Operation Greenback documented over $2 billion
in U.S. currency which had been laundered through international transactions by just seven organizations. 52 Hence, Greenback and similar programs have aptly demonstrated the effectiveness of having and enforcing
reporting requirements. 53 Indeed, although the IRS has no direct prosecutive role in violations of Title 31, it has generated some 450 prosecution
recommendations in the past several years and gives every indication of
an interest in pursuing that program further. 54
F.

INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,

SECTION

60501

The Service's excellent results from Operation Greenback have led it
to enthusiastically enforce reporting requirements like those found in 31
U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. Recognizing this, Congress added Section 60501 to
Title 26 as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984. Section 60501 requires all
businesses receiving $10,000 or more in a currency transaction after December 31, 1984 to file a Form 8300 with the Internal Revenue Service.
According to the Chief of the Service's Criminal Investigation Division,
Richard Wassenaar, of the first 300 such forms filed, many were from
lawyers claiming the attorney/client privilege against disclosing the identity of the one making the currency payment. 55 Substantial litigation will
no doubt be required before the absolute requirements of Section 60501
are established, particularly since the bar is so directly affected.
IV. Legislative Remedies: The 99th Congress (1985-86)
As if content with its efforts in 1983-84, the 99th Congress got off to a

slow start and produced little of substance in 1985. But its inaction probably stemmed not so much from lack of interest, but from its obvious
preoccupation with the debt and tax reform. Even more likely, as discussed elsewhere in this article, Congress may have simply run out of
substantive ideas on the subject.
52. Id. at 286.
53. In early 1985 the 1st National Bank of Boston pleaded guilty to failing to report large
currency transactions. Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1985, at I. Some commentators believe the Bank
of Boston's revelations are merely the "tip of the iceberg." Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1985, at
, quoting Sen. Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY). Other prosecutions including that of the Crocker
Bank have followed. See More Americans Using Illegal Tax Havens, Houston Chron., Sept.

1, 1985, at 22.
54. Remarks of Richard C. Wassenaar, Asst. Commissioner (Criminal Investigations),
IRS, at Washington Tax Conf., San Antonio, Texas (May 2, 1985). See also IRS Uses More
Undercover Work to Go after Suspect Tax Shelters, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1985. at 25.
55. Id.

SUMMER 1986

1042

A.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUTHORIZATION ACT

There has been some legislation in the 99th Congress which was designed to have an effect on international criminal activity in one form or
another. For example, the Department of State Authorization Act 56 , included a provision which directed the Department of State to cooperate
with U.S. law enforcement agencies in establishing a "comprehensive
information system on all drug arrests of foreign nationals in the United
States." The idea behind this provision is that U.S. embassies abroad
should be made aware of which foreign nationals should be denied U.S.
visas. For years the State Department has claimed unfamiliarity with the
traffickers' names and faces while law enforcement agencies have complained bitterly about the State Department's unwillingness to assist in
excluding these people. The State Department legislation also provides
that the newly created National Drug Enforcement Policy Board shall
"agree on uniform guidelines which would permit the sharing of information on foreign drug traffickers" and within six months report to the
House and Senate on steps being taken to implement this idea.
In many ways, the State Department legislation epitomizes the dilemma
now facing Congress in attempting to combat transnational crime. Knowledgeable Members and staff know that the State Department and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service face an impossible task in excluding foreign drug traffickers, not to mention con artists, terrorists, and
spies. Yet a "solution" is concocted which Members and their aides tout
to their concerned constituents as a remedy for the problem. Thus, Congress has assumed the information exists, and mandated that a system
for information exchange be designed within a very short time (since it
only allows six months before a report must be made). It has thus reacted
to citizen pressure to do something and presented itself with an excellent
future opportunity to criticize the respective agencies for having either
failed to implement the policy on time or having implemented it inadequately since, in later years, there is no doubt that drug traffickers and
others will still be shown to have obtained visas.
The State Department legislation also includes a provision to create a
United States International Narcotics Control Commission which will
"monitor and promote international compliance with Narcotics treaties,
including eradication and other relevant issues and to monitor and encourage U.S. government and private programs seeking to expand international cooperation against drug abuse and narcotics trafficking."

56. H.R. 2068, P.L. 99-93 (August 16, 1985).
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AUTHORIZATION ACT

The Department of Defense Authorization Act also contains provisions
which are designed to affect the transnational crime problem. Section
1421 of the Act would require a Coast Guard person to serve on all U.S.
Naval vessels patrolling "drug interdiction areas." This provision is designed to supplement earlier legislation which exempted U.S. military
participation in the narcotics interdiction area from the Posse Comitatus
Act.

57

Not surprisingly, the Department of Defense legislation also includes
two sections requiring more reports. Section 1422 required the Defense
Department to report in December 1985 on its drug interdiction efforts
and Section 1424 requires a study of the use of E-2 military aircraft for
drug interdiction.
The 99th Congress has also passed the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985.58 Section 605 of that Act amends
the Mansfield Amendment to a previous foreign aid bill to allow officers
and employees of the United States to be present "during direct police
arrest actions with respect to narcotic control efforts in a foreign country."
In July 1986, U.S. troops were sent to Bolivia under these auspices.
Section 619 of the foreign aid bill also addressed the so-called Cuban drug
trafficking problem by recommending U.N. and OAS action and made
certain findings on "drug trafficking and the problem of total confidentiality of certain foreign bank accounts." These were:
" Several banks in Latin America and the Caribbean are used by narcotics
traffickers as depositories for money obtained in providing illicit drugs to the
United States and other countries of the region;
" Offshore banks which offer total confidentiality provide a service which assists
the operations of the illicit drug traffickers; and
" Cooperation in gaining access to the bank accounts of such narcotics traffickers would materially assist United States authorities in controlling the
59
activities of such traffickers.

Based on these findings, Congress expressed as its policy: (1) that the
President negotiate treaties with all countries providing confidentiality
(giving high priority to Caribbean countries), and (2) again directed the
President to include reports on the results of such treaty actions in his
annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. 60 In this section
57. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1982).

58. P.L. 99-83 (Aug. 8, 1985).

59. Sec. 619 of International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985.
60. In this respect Congress need provide little additional urging to the Executive Branch.
Numerous agencies have conscientiously sought to further bilateral and even multilateral
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Congress also "reaffirmed its intention to obtain maximum cooperation
on the part of all governments for the purpose of halting international
drug trafficking, and constantly to evaluate the cooperation of those governments receiving assistance from the United States."
C. MONEY LAUNDERING ACT

During the summer of 1985, the Administration introduced, through
Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) S. 1335, the Money Laundering and
Related Crimes Act of 1985. This novel bill is designed to plug various
loopholes faced by investigators and prosecutors in attempting to combat
international narcotics trafficking. The bill creates a new offense which
penalizes one who conducts a transaction involving either monetary instruments or the wire transfer of funds, which affects interstate or foreign
commerce or which is conducted through a financial institution which is
engaged in interstate commerce. The government would have to show
that the person acted with the intent to promote or carry on unlawful
activity or that the person knew or acted in reckless disregard of the fact
that the monetary instruments or funds represented the proceeds of some
unlawful activity. The punishment for violations would be up to twenty
years imprisonment and a fine of up to $250,000 or twice the value of the
monetary instruments or wire transferred funds. The bill also contains a
forfeiture provision allowing for government-initiated civil or criminal
actions. There is no private right of action.
Seldom have recent legislative efforts been so obviously designed to
have extraterritorial application. In fact, S. 1335 states specifically that
the Act is to be applied in an extraterritorial manner if the government
can prove the defendant had actual (as opposed to acting with reckless
disregard) knowledge of the unlawful activity which generated the funds.
Thus the "international" scienter standard differs somewhat from the
domestic standard. In any case, it makes it clear that the U.S. government
could indict a foreign bank president or employee if it could prove that
he had actual knowledge that the funds were derived from some unlawful
activity in the United States. The extraterritorial provision is limited to
transactions involving more than $10,000.
The bill amends the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,61 by making
it clear that financial records may be transferred among different agencies
of the government if there is reason to believe that the records may be
relevant to a matter within another agency's jurisdiction. The bill also
arrangements for some time. See U.S. See!ks Treaties Against Money Crimes, Wall St. J.,

Oct. 31, 1985, at 32.
61.

12 U.S.C. § 3412(a).
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makes it clear that a banker may make certain disclosures to government
agents with impunity. S. 1335 includes a provision which amends the Right
to Financial Privacy Act by preempting any state and local laws which
are more restrictive.
Finally, the bill would grant the Treasury Department new summons
authority to enforce the provisions of the Act by requiring the production
of books, papers and records from financial institutions which operate or
conduct business in the United States. The bill even precludes the possibility of the government paying banks for reproduction costs in connection with providing materials pursuant to summonses, thus defusing
a somewhat volatile issue in the past. S. 1335 amends the Bank Secrecy
Act, 62 to increase its penalties from $10,000 per violation to a new penalty
of not more than the amount of a transaction up to $1 million or $25,000,
whichever is greater. As is frequently the case with recently enacted
criminal legislation, the new money laundering statute would become a
predicate offense under the RICO statute. 63 Violations of the Bank Secrecy Act are already RICO predicate offenses as discussed previously.
V. Conclusion
Recently Congressional action in this area reflects a continuing interest
in joint Treasury-Justice operations and illustrates the relative inability
of Congress to cope with the broader question of transnational crime. In
fact, the amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act, as helpful as they may
prove to be, vividly illustrate the limited ability of Congress to have an
impact. New reporting requirements and penalties are obviously oriented
towards domestic U.S. business activities. It is not feasible to require
offshore commercial banks or any other entity in a tax haven to report
currency transactions to the Treasury, although some prosecution-oriented government employees would like nothing better.
In the meantime, as policymakers search for remedies, the public can
count on the situation deteriorating further. Put simply, those wishing to
apply the brakes to international crime must cope with the following
dynamics:
(1) an unchecked, ever increasing demand for narcotics in the United
States and Western Europe which in turn creates vast hordes of currency in need of deposit or investment;
(2) high tax rates in the world's most important democracies which
tend to encourage citizens to funnel income offshore;
62. 13 U.S.C. § 5318.

63. 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
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(3) increasingly innovative fraud schemes, particularly during inflationary periods, which contribute to the pool of dirty money seeking
safe refuge;
(4) limited development potential for certain thus far underdeveloped
secrecy havens which leads them to forsake trade and agricultural economic development options in favor of more immediate revenue sources
based on registration and license fees for banks, trusts, trading and
insurance companies, and ships.
Arrayed against these elements is a U.S. government which has been
uncoordinated. As the discussion above indicates, the so-called "offshore
crime problem" is fraught with foreign policy implications, yet the State
Department has never been particularly concerned if the subject is "crime."
Its focus is distinctly political and most would-be Caribbean tax havens
such as St. Vincent, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos are rarely even
visited by State Department personnel. 64 Conversely, traditional State
Department attitudes may have had beneficial long-term effects in the
case of established havens such as the Bahamas, Panama, and Switzerland
where heavy-handed U.S. enforcement techniques have not been well
received. Hence, experience has shown the State Department on the one
hand to be naive about the potential for international crime, but, on the
other hand, justifiably concerned about the collateral effects of taking a
myopic, undiplomatic approach to dealing with such strategically key
jurisdictions as Panama and Hong Kong.
Long-term resolutions to most of the problems which have emerged in
this area do not appear to be at hand. Because of the nature of the problem,
Congress is hard pressed to have any additional significant influence. Its
actions in 1985 primarily consisted of calling for reports and urging meetings and international accommodation. Congress is now clearly to the
point of grasping at straws, and in its search for remedies it has been
willing to disperse new authority to various Executive Branch agencies.
In so doing it has created new problems relating to inter-agency management of the Executive Branch. Certainly recent legislation reinforces the
absolute necessity for coordination: for example, given the new powers
accorded the Secretary of Treasury in 1984 and 1985, he would be well
advised to communicate with his counterparts at State and Justice before
acting in this area.
At the same time the Justice Department should follow through on its
promise to rein in its Assistant U.S. Attorneys and agents who can foment
64. When the Turks and Caicos went through a crucial two year period of development
as a haven in 1983-84, the senior American official on the scene was a U.S. Air Force Captain
in charge of a tracking station at Grand Turk.
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an international crisis overnight with a grand jury subpoena. And the
State Department ought to educate itself about just how severe the transnational crime problem has become.
Finally, Congress, the Executive Branch and even the courts must
realize that a whole new area of jurisprudence is developing before their
eyes and a strategic, enlightened view of how the various parts should fit
together is long overdue.
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